The Arab Narrative: What’s wrong with a Fence?

Between 1992-2002, hundreds of Jews had been murdered by Arab suicide bombers who had entered Israel from the Palestinian Authority. Israel got tired of all the killing. Israel decided to protect itself. It would build a security fence.

The purpose of this fence was to cut off easy access to Israel. The goal of the fence was to stop ‘terrorism of the most brutal kind’ (“Questions and Answers: Israel’s Security fence”, The State of Israel, Ministry of Defence, 2003; last updated, February 22, 2004).

At the time the fence was being constructed, Israel stated that, “The fact that over 800 men, women and children have been killed in horrific suicide bombings and other terror attacks clearly justifies the attempt to place a physical barrier in the path of terrorists” (ibid). Israel declared that it “not only has the right but also the obligation to do everything in its power to lessen the impact and scope of terrorism on the citizens of Israel” (ibid).

The fence wasn’t being built to establish a de facto border (ibid). It was being built because Jews were being brutally murdered. The fence seemed an appropriate—and passive—way to address that problem.

By 2007, the effect of this barrier was obvious for all to see:  only two Palestinian suicide bombers had managed—in 2006--to sneak into Israel for attacks that killed 11 people and wounded 30 others (“Death toll of Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians hit a low in 2006”, mcclatchydc.com, June, 14, 2007). By June, 2007, Israel had gone nine months without a single suicide bombing inside its borders (ibid). These numbers compare to a high of 289 suicide bombing deaths in 2002, the year Israel decided to build the Fence (ibid).

In case readers didn’t understand the significance of these numbers, at least one objective observer concluded that one major factor in “Israel's success in insulating most of its citizens” against terror was the Fence (ibid).

“The security fence was put up to stop terror,” a spokesperson for the Israel Defence Force said, “and that's what it's doing" (ibid).

The Israelis were happy. The fence worked.

But then, it turned out that this Fence wasn’t a barrier built to block Arab terror. It was something else.

That fence, anti-Israel advocates said, was “a unilateral Israeli move to delineate permanent borderlines and gain hold of Palestinian lands” (“Israeli Security Fence Architect: Why The Barrier Had to Be Built”, Al Monitor, July 1, 2012). It was, according to an updated Arab Narrative, an Apartheid Wall. It wasn’t built to protect anyone. It was built to harm Arabs—to cut off Arabs from their agricultural land. It wasn’t a Wall. It wasn’t a fence. It was a Separation Barrier, designed to separate Arabs from their ability to survive (“Is it a Fence? Is it a Wall? No, it’s a Separation Barrier”, Electronic Intifada, August 1, 2003).

It was a physical example of Israeli oppression. It was a visual record of that oppression (“Walled off: 12 years of Israel’s separation barrier”, Al Jazeera America, March 12, 2014). It expanded Israel’s theft of ‘Palestinian’ land (“ The Wall,” StoptheWall, no date).

The United Nations joined the anti-Israel chorus. Its pro-‘Palestinian’ UNRWA (“Barrier Monitoring Unit”, above, ibid), saw to it that the Fence was declared illegal (ibid).  

The Israelis actually believed that this security fence was a way to block Arab terror. Terror statistics proved that.

But Israelis got it wrong. The Arab Narrative drowned Israel in a tsunami of propaganda.  Palestinian spin-meisters maneuvered a gullible West into believing that the Fence violated ‘Palestinian’ human rights (“The Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem, January 1, 2011).  After all, didn’t it restrict Arabs’ freedom of movement (ibid)?

Even if the Fence stopped terror attacks, it wasn’t a true solution. It wasn’t a means to protect Jews. It was “the most extreme solution and one that causes the greatest harm to the local population” (ibid).

Israel has been demonized (the Fence is Apartheid) and criminalized (it’s illegal) over this fence. We are reminded of this because recent news has reached us of another Fence. This Fence is in Saudi Arabia (“New Saudi Border Security Policy: Shoot on Sight”, PJ Media, January 21, 2015). The Saudis, like the Israelis, are worried about militant Muslims (ISIS) crossing into their country to kill. To protect themselves, they have taken a cue from Israel: they’re building a Wall—600 miles long—to seal their borders (ibid). This Fence, you should note, is at least 30 per cent longer than Israel’s Fence.

To supplement the Fence, the Saudis order their border guards to shoot on sight anyone approaching the Fence. Israel doesn’t have such an order.

No one has complained about the Saudi Fence—or its order to police to shoot on sight. No one objects.

But then, why should anyone want to complain about protecting oneself? What’s wrong with a Fence?