Israeli political leaders are often portrayed as appearing uncertain about how to deal with a double-edged enemy sword: terror attacks inside Israel and rocket attacks from Arab-held territory. The recent terror attack that began August 18, 2011 on the highway to Eilat, followed by rockets from Gaza, represent an excellent example of how terror attacks can make a government look weak: Israeli officials were criticized for not responding aggressively enough—or soon enough; letters to the Editor at the Jerusalem Post called the government’s response ‘cowardly’, characterized more by fear and timidity than anything else; and Leftist columnists have, essentially, called Israel’s response ‘self-defeating’.
But are these criticisms correct?
A closer reading of the government’s response to the attacks of August 18 -25, 2011 suggests a different conclusion. It suggests that this response was neither haphazard, disorganized or cowardly; rather, the response appears to derive from a carefully constructed military doctrine that has been custom-tailored to fit Israel’s security needs, its military capabilities and its Regional and international geopolitical realities. What we saw might be called, ‘nuanced response’. This response reflects Israel’s basic national values as they apply to our neighbors, and it reveals what she believes about warfare against terror committed by those neighbors.
Israeli military doctrine (see http://www.idf.il/english) contains several elements, including: prevent escalation; determine outcomes quickly; combat terrorism; very low casualty rate. We will see these in action; but first, let’s define our terms. We can start with an over-arching general concept: ‘military doctrine’ is a set of principles which guide the use of military force to achieve specific goals (a definition similar to NATO’s definition). Next, more specifically, we can define ‘doctrine’ as a formal expression of thought that the military believes is relevant at any given time which covers the nature of a conflict, preparation for that conflict, and the method(s) for engaging in that conflict (Canada’s definition). We can also state that doctrine will always look at military technology, the national and geopolitical realities facing a country, the capabilities of that country’s military—and the capabilities of its enemies (see Wikipedia, ’Military Doctrine’).
Put another way, ‘doctrine’ is a set of assertions we accept as true in an action domain (Ribbonfarm.com). Let’s look at some details, to understand how ‘doctrine’ affects military action by Israel—and reveals basic national values.
-the nature of the conflict: with Hamas and its satellites, Israel faces an asymmetrical war, which is war between two belligerents whose relative power and resources differ significantly, where the ‘weaker’ combatant will use atypical and illegal tactics to attempt to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality. Tactics of the ‘weaker’ combatant will include what we have already seen with Hamas and Al Qeida: using clearly marked medical vehicles for combat purposes, hiding within civilian populations, using civilian environments to initiate combat aggression, ambush and other tactics that are generally prohibited by conventional war rules, as well as using the media to influence the outcome of war (see Wikipedia, ‘Asymmetric warfare’). How should Israel, committed to international rules of war, deal with such an enemy?
-geopolitical realities: Israel is a singularly Jewish nation surrounded by hostile Muslim countries that view the Jewish state as a repulsive and foreign form of apostasy, a nation that brings religious impurification to the Region. While Israel occupies less than 1 per cent of total Regional real estate, the surrounding nations are irreconcilably hostile to Jews on any per cent of land they demand to be theirs. Today, the Arabs surrounding Israel believe they have the upper hand in their propaganda war against Israel’s existence, and believe further that the United Nations will, in a matter of weeks, declare land not in their hands (but in Israel’s hands) to be theirs; they see the nations of the world agreeing to isolate, condemn and delegitimize Israel sufficiently, to take land away from her in order to shrink the real estate of the hated Jew and expand the real estate of the Arab-Muslim. There is evidence to suggest that the Arabs may score a success (of some kind) in this attempt, for the nations of the UN do not at this moment appear sensitive to or caring about Israel’s security needs. In addition, while Israel’s closest enemy is Hamas and its satellites, Israel must balance every military decision against a larger Middle East military reality: any time Israel acts against Hamas, it can trigger the simultaneous intervention of heavily armed and professionally trained armies of multiple hostile surrounding countries; a single military action against guerrilla terrorists could, in theory, trigger a Regional form of Armageddon. How does Israel deal with an asymmetrical enemy in this context—and survive?
-national realities: within Israel, there is no consensus regarding how to handle Arab attempts to expand its territorial control at Israel’s expense. Most polls appear to suggest that Israel might be split close to 50-50 (once you factor in the margin of error) on the topic of a two-state solution (forming a new ‘Palestine’ from West Bank and Gaza). Although the political Left in Israel is a relative minority, it controls enough of the media, the military, the justice system and the bureaucracy to exert an influence far greater than its numbers—and they are aggressive about approving a new Arab state and in their use of Arab propaganda to attack Israel’s credibility and her international and Regional reputation. Moreover, the split between the yeas and nays on this question is exacerbated by religion, not just politics, which means that political differences can get nasty. Every soldier killed in combat (or kidnapped) and every citizen murdered by a terrorist has the potential to be used to bring down a government (recall the Schalit family attacks against the Prime Minister). Put another way, for every citizen who wants Israel to obliterate Gaza, there might be another citizen who might concede that the Arab might have the right to attack Jews to achieve his political goals. How does an Israeil government fight its enemies when it may not have a clear mandate to do so?
-military technology: the Israel military establishment invents, manufacturers and uses some of the most sophisticated military and intelligence technology in the world. Because the USA sells high-level military hardware to all potential combatants (except Fatah-Hamas) in the Middle East, Israel must maintain a superior qualitative edge; and one important way to protect that superiority is to keep knowledge secret. The less an enemy learns about your technology, the better off you will be. How does Israel use its technological advantage without revealing too much about the nature of that advantage?
-the capabilities of Israel’s enemies: if the only war Israel must fight is against guerrilla-style terrorists who have few sophisticated weapons, then we can argue that Israel has military superiority. Israel should be able to contain and control most Hamas aggressions. But we all know that Hamas is not Israel’s only armed enemy. Egypt alone can put a million soldiers into the Sinai. Iran seeks a nuclear weapon for an anti-Israel purpose. How does Israel fight Hamas without drawing these others immediately into the fray?
Israel’s own military capability: Israel is known to be a powerful military adversary. She is believed to have nuclear capability. How does she assert that power without provoking a pre-emptive attack?
The most difficult issues here are national and geopolitical realities. In the current environment, one can reasonably argue that any decision Israel makes to initiate military action against terrorists could easily be damned and condemned by 40- 52 percent of Israel’s population, and could be attacked without mercy by perhaps 65% of the media—and that’s before the Arab propaganda machine gets going, before anti-Israel international media crank up and before the UN and both local and International Human Rights groups get involved. This singular reality reminds one of a poison-snake farmer having to wade ankle-deep into a snake pit in order to remove three trouble-making snakes—without getting bitten. You do not do this with a confused mental state or an incompetent skill-set, and you do not survive the task if you are trembling with fear. Everyone who calls this government confused, incompetent or cowardly may not be looking clearly at the facts on the ground: to face these variables and survive, you have to know what you are doing, you must have confidence in what you do-- and you have to understand how to balance the risks/realities you face.
For a nation contemplating the nature of war, this understanding becomes a ‘military doctrine’—if it is clear, organized and understood down the chain of command. In Israel, the government’s responses to the terrorism of August 18 -25 suggest that such a doctrine exists for her military. Without going into a discussion of the differences between strategy and doctrine, let’s simply say that ‘nuanced response’ fits into that doctrine. Look at what happened after the Eilat/rocket attacks:
-Israel Air Force (IAF) struck quickly;
-the strikes were limited;
-the pin-point nature of the strikes obviously required intelligence gathered from multiple sources;
-the strikes utilized high-tech capabilities-- in communications, intelligence, ordinance or aircraft—or all of the above;
-after limited ‘quick-hits’, Israel stopped its attack. I would suggest that, at this point, the Israel government monitored national, international and enemy responses;
-Israel struck again;
- the strikes were limited;
-high-tech was employed;
-Israel stopped its attack.
The goal of this ‘nuanced response’ appears specific to terror attacks. It is obviously not designed to eradicate terrorism. It is designed to combat individual acts of terrorism. Its structure and implementation also reflect what Israel apparently believes about her neighbors: their attitudes and behaviour are, generally, to be respected (see below); acts of aggression against Israel are in fact tolerated—to a degree (think about ongoing rockets falling on Israel’s south); response to terror is to be careful, limited and surgical in nature; and finally, if the purpose of these defensive military actions is to mete out punishment, its purpose seems also to do so with delicacy, showing deference to a foe even in combat. Nuanced response is not a ‘game-changer’. It is a ‘tension-reducer’ between two combatants.
Why else would Israel’s response be so nuanced? It is not simply because Israel is afraid of the UN; If she were truly afraid of the UN, she might not have undertaken Operation Cast Lead in Gaza at the end of 2008. Rather, Israel uses a nuanced response because she has defined her basic national beliefs in a way that requires her to respect her neighbor’s needs, beliefs and safety, even if that neighbour does not reciprocate. Respect for the Arab has permeated the work of Shimon Peres for at least fifteen years. Respect for the Arab permeates the judiciary. It appears required to reach the highest military ranks—and then shows up in decisions made at that level. It also colors and often shapes Israel’s media. Ask the residents of West Bank hilltops about this. They understand the institutionalized respect for the Arab. Residents of Tel Aviv highrise apartments do not.
The UN PA statehood deliberations will soon begin. In this type of situation (‘peace’ deliberations about to ‘happen’), the Arabs typically will attack. They will ambush and kill Jews. Typically, the Israeli reaction will be immediate—but respectful; only certain targets will be hit, only a certain number of sorties will be attempted, only certain weapons systems will be employed. Arabs in Gaza can rest assured that their neighborhoods will, for the most part, remain intact. Nevertheless, even when the IDF uses pinpoint retaliatory strikes that minimize collateral damage,--and shows utmost respect for civilian (Arab) safety-- Israel stands to lose: as Barry Rubin reports (What’s really happening in the Middle East today, Love of the Land, August 25, 2011), American news outlets know how to make every Arab attack on Israel look like Israeli aggression. No matter what Israel does—she will be the aggressor and the Arab will be the victim; and every supposed incident of ‘victimization’ brings the potential of another UN vote for the Arab. Observation suggests that Israel national policy is that she must proceed cautiously as she answers terrorist attack. As we defend ourselves, current government behaviour suggests, we must use sufficient restraint to show respect for Arab safety and anger; to do otherwise would be to incur the wrath of both the Arab world and the United Nations—and a nation with Israel’s current respect for the Arab is not prepared to ruffle anyone’s feathers. So in a sense, while Israel is not afraid of anyone, her national policies seem nonetheless formulated to show more respect to the UN and the Arab than to her own citizens. This ‘Goldilocks’ approach—not too little, not too much—accepts terror attacks in order to concentrate on balancing Israel’s overall defense needs against Arab attitudes and UN impatience. It seems an attempt to assert power, but show respect, even a delicacy. It is also an approach that appears to have worked in this instance: after the air strikes, the Arabs complained; they went to the UN; they denounced Israel’s ‘escalation’--but no international outcry occurred, no UN resolutions were passed condemning Israel, no Arab armies attacked Israel, and the intensity of the rocket attacks diminished significantly. Did this approach yield a perfect result? No. War is rarely perfect. But it did accomplish three goals of Israel’s current military doctrine: it quickly ended the attacks; it fought off the terror attackers; and it created a relatively low casualty rate.
To go back to a metaphor, the farmer has successfully waded through his poison snake-pit without getting bitten—this time.
However, we might still ask if Israel’s current military doctrine—with its strategic corollaries—gives Israel its best long-term defense. We could ask if such institutionalized respect for the Arab is truly in our best interest. Does the Arab appreciate that we respond with delicacy, or do they see that deference as a sign of weakness? Does deference provoke further attack? There are three fundamental questions here: should Israel respond differently to terror; should Israel rethink this institutionalized respect for the Arab, especially as it affects the military; and, most important, would the public actually support more aggressive responses when Jews are killed for political and/or religious reasons? Until Israel answers these questions in the affirmative, this country has absolutely no chance to get away from the threat of getting ‘snake-bit’. So right now, absent a change in basic national values (a change in belief about the snakes)and a proper public mandate for action, we should understand that Israel’s ‘nuanced response’ to terror—after Jewish blood flows—will be the best we can do, so long as it works—which, in August, 2011, it did.
Next time, of course, could be a different story. Such a nuanced response may not work for the next attack. If current Israeli military policy is in fact built upon a respect for the Arab, it may be that the next Arab attack may not allow for such deference; and if that happens, then the next terror attack—and its follow-up—may not be so deftly handled. Let us pray that Israel’s military high-command will be as prepared tomorrow as they were two weeks ago. Let us also pray that we give our national leaders the mandate they need to rethink basic national values—so that they can act as Jewish leaders who represent and respect the Jewish people.
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