After just four days of existence, the Bennett-Lapid coalition government has already developed some potentially serious disagreements. These disagreements represent cracks in the superstructure of the new coalition. These cracks could lead to the collapse of the coalition.
As you will see in a moment, these cracks begin with a simple 'technical' issue. But these cracks are not limited to 'technical' issues; and that's the problem. These cracks are systemic.
The first 'crack' involves the size of the coalition. This 'unity' coalition controls (in theory) the bare minimum of Knesset seats to be called a 'government'. In practical terms, this means the coalition 'controls' just 61 seats of the 120-seat Knesset.
61 is a 'majority' of 120. This should suggest that the coalition can, in theory at least, still get its legislative agenda passed--but only if all of the political 'stars' align exactly.
For this coalition, that will be a tall order. A bare-minimum majority means that, again in theory, a single coalition MK (Member of the Knesset) who is a part of the coalition but who nonetheless refuses to vote in the Knesset with the coalition's dictates, could leave the coalition with just 60 seats for any given vote. A coalition with 60 seats does not have a Knesset majority--which in turn suggests that, in theory, the coalition lacks the power to fulfill its legislative agenda.
That's the problem. Without a dependably compliant majority, the government could end up unable to pass any legislation. It would be a frozen government.
Now all of this is theory because the Knesset does not always meet with all its 120 seats occupied. Sometimes MKs are absent. Sometimes an MK abstains--is present but does not vote.
The impact of this practical reality is simple: if the coalition can muster only 59 votes for a bill but---because of absentees and/or abstainees--the opposition is able to muster only 58 votes, then the coalition will not need 61 votes to prevail. That is, in this scenario, the final vote could be 58 votes for the coalition and just 57 votes against. At least, that's what I understand from what I have read. The coalition's legislative agenda could be saved.
These Knesset voting considerations might be doable for skilled leaders, if there are no other problems. But with this coalition, problems are everywhere.
For example, during the coalition's first four days of existence, two coalition MKs threw a monkey wrench into the 'works'. They declared they will not necessarily vote according to the wishes of their Party leaders (here and here).
Sure, such declarations of 'independence' happen in Israel's Knesset all the time. Mks do, sometimes, vote their conscience despite what their leaders want.
Nevertheless, here's the operational problem--and why these two MKS create a serious crack in the coalition. If a coalition had a total of, say, 66 seats (not 61), as many as five 'defections' on any particular vote could be meaningless because the coalition will still be able to bring 61 seats--a majority--to a Knesset vote (66-5=61). But if the coalition has only 61 seats, as is the case with this coalition, the coalition will lose its majority when only one Mk 'defects'. If two or more MK 'defect' or are absent, the coalition could fail to achieve any number of its goals on its legislative agenda.
Just days old, this coalition is in trouble. There is no cushion. The coalition majority margin really is razor thin.
With two coalition MKs already asserting their 'independence' so early in the coalition's life, all of Israel now realizes that there is no wiggle room in this coalition to offset the impact of any non-supportive coalition MKs--on any vote. To succeed, the coalition has to make sure that everyone in the coalition must vote according to the coalition's desires. For a country like Israel, which is so fractious, argumentative and stubborn, getting 100% obedience for any Knesset vote would be a challenge in any case. But with two MKs already showing 'independence,' are we to conclude that maintaining its 61-seat majority will be an impossibility for this coalition? That could happen.
This reality has practical consequences for the
Bennett-Lapid coalition because just days into its existence, the coalition has also begun to show additional signs of cracking. Yes, some of these additional cracks do not seem fatal. But they are still disturbing. Taken together, they threaten the coalition's very survival.
These additional cracks are not technical or 'procedural'. They are more serious. They speak directly to irreconcilable ideological differences that exist between Parties in this politically ill-begotten coalition.
The three additional cracks are: (1) the issue of how to address what some Arabs in Israel call a 'historical injustice' against them; (2) the issue of legitimizing currently illegal Bedouin settlements in the Negev; and (3) the coalition desire to extend (that is, renew) a current law that prevents Arabs who are married, but currently separated by the de facto border between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), from 'reuniting' in Israel (see below).
These three additional cracks first began to appear on June 15th, the second full day of the coalition. That was when coalition member Mansour Abbas (head of the Arab-Islamist Ra'am Party) announced that, during his tenure in the coalition, he will commit to fixing the "historical injustice" Arabs in Israel suffer (here).
The phrase 'historical injustice' is not an Israel-friendly term. It is a kind of code-word for anti-Israel Islamists and their supporters. It is commonly used as a cudgel to demonize and/or agitate against Israel. It is not generally used in the frequently collegial corridors of an Israeli ruling coalition.
Indeed, at first, Mansour Abbas's use of the phrase did not cause much comment. But that changed two days later.
What changed was, after Abbas made his statement about those 'historical injustices', an Arab Imam in the Israeli city of Lod was arrested by Israeli police for inciting violence. What did this Imam do to deserve getting arrested? He apparently 'clarified' for his internet followers what Mansour Abbas must have meant when he had spoken of "addressing" the 'historical injustice against Arabs'. The Imam had posted a video on the internet saying this is how to fix those injustices.
What did his 'this' refer to? It referred to what some Israeli Arabs feel is 'the right thing to do'. It referred to a video the Imam had himself posted showing the brutal murder of two Israeli police officers, with an accompanying caption that said, "Be with me. [this is] The best way to deal with injustice" (here). He was arrested for inciting violence against the police.
This kind of anti-Israel outrage is not unusual for Israel. Too often, when an Arab politician calls to deal with some kind of 'injustice' committed--or allegedly committed--against the Israeli-Arab community, it is followed by words of a more radically anti-Jew Arab--who, typically, calls to kill or to attack Jews. Sometimes, such calls for violence have been suggested by the same Arab politician who made the accusation of 'injustice'.
Public calls by Islamists for violence against Jews in Israel happen. Such calls are part of Israel's democratic culture, one that grants to Arabs in Israel far more freedom than Arabs get in any Arab country in the Middle East. Too often, that freedom leads to violence.
In the Middle East, perception is everything, and the Islamist Mansour Abbas' presence in the coalition--and his use of the phrase 'historical injustices'--was immediately associated with the Imam's call to violence. That association could be, perhaps, just an unintended consequence of an Arab politician echoing Muslim attitudes towards Israel. But whatever its motivation, those words nonetheless left in many Israeli 'mouths' a bad taste for what the coalition might have done to Israel by including an Islamist in the coalition in the first place. That bad taste could threaten the coalition. It could destroy the public's confidence in the coalition.
The second of these three additional cracks showing up in the coalition's first week of existence involved the question of legitimizing currently illegal Bedouin settlements in the Negev. Over the course of Israel's 73-year history, Israelis have fought and died trying to defend literally every inch of Jewish land in Israel. They do not want those bloody battles to be forsworn. They do not want Jewish-owned land to be given away. Nor do they want to give a soapbox to Israel-hating Islamists who will encourage Arabs to take over Jewish land.
Of course, some call this Jewish reluctance to give up land 'Jewish racism'. But many Israelis beg to differ. They see such calls by Arabs instead as an example of Arab racism against Jews--for these Arab claims over Jewish land are usually followed by Arabs then claiming the disputed land as their land. Following these claims, Jews are called upon to get out!
That is where the Arab racism shows up: get out, Jew!
Israelis feel it. They feel the threat of it.
With this coalition just days old, Mansour Abbas of the Arab-Islamist Ra'am Party stepped up to a microphone and did nothing to allay these Jewish land fears. Instead, he fed these fears by suggesting clearly that he will not support the Bennett-Lapid coalition, and will work against the coalition if Israel takes no steps to recognize and legitimize Arab Bedouin villages in the Negev.
This threat was not good news for coalition stability. This coalition could truly crack apart because Israelis are really sensitive about how believers in Islam use language in Israel's political sphere. They have good reason to believe that Islamists shape political language in Israel to smear Israel, to demonize Israel and to question Israel's existence and its national rights.Therefore, if this leader of the Ra'am Party makes what many perceive to be an anti-Israel demand regarding Bedouin land in the Negev, that demand doesn't just threaten to destabilize the coalition. It threatens to blow up the coalition.
The third additional crack (for a total of four for the coalition's first week) appeared when coalition member Meretz Party announced it would not support the coalition's call to renew an Israeli law that prevents married couples separated by the de facto border between Israel and the PA from reuniting in Israel (here). This Party (Meretz) objected to the coalition's desire to extend this law.
By the way, the reason for this current law to exist in the first place has nothing to do with what some call, racism. The reason for the law is to prevent fictitious marriages. It is to prohibit the State from allowing anti-Israel Arab activists who live in the PA to enter into a fraudulent marriage with an Arab-Israeli just to receive a free pass to enter Israel (as a wife reunifying with her husband--or a husband to reunify with his wife), no questions asked (here).
Some in the coalition see this existing law as a security issue, to keep Israel safe (here). Indeed, given the PA's open and public hostility to Israel's right to exist, to say nothing of the wars Israel must fight every few years against Palestinian Jew-hate, wanting to renew this law is certainly reasonable.
Others in the coalition--including Mansour Abbas of the Ra'am Party and now Meretz--oppose renewing this law. Apparently, they do not want to block PA Arabs from living in Israel.
Without the votes of Meretz and Ra'am, this part of the coalition political agenda will fail. Failure is never a good start for any coalition.
Goodness. When Bennett agreed to create a 'unity' government, he did so saying specifically he wanted to end the political 'chaos' in Israel. But Bennett did not end chaos. He has simply introduced into Israel a different kind of political chaos.
The ink on this government coalition isn't even dry yet. The coalition's first week hasn't even ended yet--and all we can see are these cracks showing up?
This does not bode well for Bennett. My guess is, this coalition is on very, very thin ice. Will it last?
Not at this rate, it won't..
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