The danger of covid--and lockdown--in Israel: is anyone listening?

(Latest update: January 3, 2021) 

According to the most current figures available for Israel, the total number of recorded cases of covid in Israel is 419,312. This covers the period March, 2020 (when covid first came to Israel) and December 30, 2020 (the latest date data was available for this essay). 

This number means that Israel's Health authorities have told us that there have been in Israel a total 419,312 people who have tested positive for covid-19, or Coronavirus. Of those 419,312 covid-positive Israelis, a total of 3,314 have died. 

Do some math. Divide the total number of those who have died by the total number of Israelis who have tested positive (3,314/419,312). That yields a number: .007903. This number is just under 8 tenths of one percent. That's the mortality rate for covid in Israel.

A survival rate is different. A survival rate tells us how many people with covid are still alive. Therefore, if approximately 8 tenths of one percent have died, then we can assume that the remaining 99.2 percent of covid-positive Israelis have survived. 

That's right. After nine months of panic, confusion and anger, Israel's covid survival rate is app. 99.2%. This 99.2% survival rate is for all ages and all demographics. Literally 99.2 percent of everyone in Israel who has tested positive for covid-19 since inception, has lived.

That's how dangerous covid is in Israel. Nevertheless, covid is still considered to be extremely dangerous--so dangerous that our tiny nation has begun its third lockdown to fight covid. Apparently, a 99.2% survival rate just isn't good enough to keep us not locked down.. 

To understand exactly what this 99.2% survival rate for covid means, think for a moment about the survival rate for men with lung cancer in Israel. Only 33% of men in Israel diagnosed with lung cancer survive (here).

In a report dated, May 31, 2020, the Israel Cancer Association reported that "about 80,000 Israelis have died from the harmful effect of smoking" (here) over the past decade. That adds up to about 8,000 (mostly) lung cancer deaths a year.

By March 2021--the end of one year of covid--will covid also have killed 8,000 Israelis? Well, right now, the end of nine months of covid, there are only 3,314 deaths. For covid to kill 8,000 by March, 2021, Israel would have to see more covid deaths in the next three months (4,686) than in the first nine months combined. Since Israel is now aggressively inoculating its population, that doesn't seem likely. 

This is an important observation, especially when you attempt to compare how Israel reacts to both diseases--covid and lung cancer. For covid, we panic. We fine violators. We shut down Israel's economy. We force lockdowns. 

By contrast, we do almost nothing to stop lung cancer. How can Israel stop or slow lung  cancer? According to at least one opinion, the leading risk factor of lung cancer in Israel is smoking. What does Israel do to protect Israelis from smoking death? Close to nothing.

Specifically, is smoking banned in Israel? No. Are smokers arrested? No. Are people caught congregating in groups to smoke fined? No.

Are smokers prohibited from going to work? No. Are smokers quarantined until a blood test shows no nicotine in their bloodstream? No.

Why not? Israelis are banned, prohibited and otherwise limited and locked down in order to stop a contagious disease (covid). Why aren't Israelis prohibited, banned or limited from smoking with similar prohibitions in order to stop a smoking disease--especially one that will probably kill more people in one year than covid? 

There are other inconsistencies with our treatment of covid. Look at the  economic dislocation we have suffered. So far, 3,314 Israelis had died from covid. That means that the lives of 3,314 families have been devastated. Those losses are tragic.

 But the covid tragedy goes beyond physical death. For example, so far this year, some 40,000 businesses have been forced to close (here). That means that the lives of as many as (at least) 100,000 Israeli business owners' families have been  shattered by covid, if one includes spouses and children. Those losses are also tragic.

Who has weighed the tragedies of 3,314 shattered families with/against up to 100,000 shattered family lives? The price Israel pays to fight covid with lockdowns is the price of 100,000 people losing their livelihoods. 

Who determined that the attempt to save lives required the loss of up to 40,000 family businesses in 2020 and perhaps another 60,000 in 2021 (ibid)? Does anyone in the government care about these losses?

Covid's lockdown tragedy doesn't end with shuttered businesses. On top of the business losses, there are losses attributable to depression and suicide: since March, 2020, Israel has seen "unprecedented levels of suicide calls" to crisis hotlines (here). So far (through November 5, the latest date available), Israel has seen as many as 13 suicides in a single 11-day period--and 252 suicide attempts in the same period (ibid). This is horrific.

How many suicides will covid's lockdowns and business losses provoke? How many families of failed business owners will suffer the trauma of increased family abuse brought on by covid-created fear, worry--and the frustration of being unable to feed and house one's family? 

The impact of covid gets worse: between March, 2020, when Israel's first covid death occurred, and November 2020, the latest date for stats, women in Israel seeking shelter from domestic abuse soared by 350% (here). Has anyone included these tragedies into the calculus used to determine a lockdown?

Israel has a 99.2% survival rate. Therefore, we lock down because.....? We force the shuttering of thousands of small family businesses, driving many out of  business forever because.....? We force an unprecedented number of women into shelters to escape abuse provoked by lockdowns because.....?

Remember, doctors are not at all convinced that lockdowns do more good than harm; in fact, according to some, lockdowns do more harm than good (here). In the face of such uncertainty, why embrace the known harms done by locking us down?

We don't even know if the razzle-dazzle-new-science of our inoculations will actually work (here). All we know for certain is that, in Israel, covid has a 99.2+% survival rate. Doesn't such a survival rate suggest anything to anyone?

Certainly, lockdowns might be necessary. There might well be good reasons for a lockdown. But where are those reasons? Have you seen any? 

At least one politician in Israel has already said the lockdowns are political, not medical. Because none of us has been shown the medical data to support any lockdown, his accusation goes unanswered. Yes, he could be wrong. But then, absent data, he could be correct.

Where is the data to support the lockdown? Why haven't we seen it? Does it exist?

This latest lockdown in Israel, begun Sunday, Dec 27, 2020, is scheduled to cost Israel between 2.5-3 billion shekel a week (here). Israel risks immense economic damage to do what--to protect us against a disease that has a 99.2% survival rate? 

In Israel, an unintended consequence of four elections in two years

 On Tuesday night, December 22, 2020, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) dissolved (here). It dissolved because of a Parliamentary rule. That rule was simple: Members of the Knesset (MKs) had to vote to create a new 2020 federal budget by December 23, 2020. If the vote for that budget failed in the Knesset (it failed by 2 votes on December 22, 2020 (ibid)), then the Knesset would automatically dissolve. 

In essence, this Knesset dissolution signaled that the current government had proven to be "unworkable". Dissolution meant that the Knesset saw only one solution for this "unworkable" government: a new election. Why? Because that's what happens when the Knesset dissolves. An election is required.  

Apparently, Israel really believes that a new election is the solution to a broken government. Yes, a new election is just what the doctor ordered. It would bring into the Knesset a clean slate of MKs who would be more cooperative, less interested in political name-calling and more focused on completing the requirements of the nation's business.

Really? Of course!

According to Knesset rules, once a Knesset dissolves, a new national election must be held within the following 90 days. For this upcoming election, that meant an election date of March 23, 2021.

That's the theory. In practice, the actual date could be moved.

If you read Israel history, you know that national elections in Israel are held every four years. But that's just more theory. In reality, the typical Israeli government falls apart sooner than every four years. 

This March 23, 2021 election is no different. But then, it's also very, very different.

You see, this upcoming March 2021 election is unique. It will be the fourth election in two years. 

This is uncharted water even for Israel's volatile political scene. It's never happened before. It is, if you will, a 'world's record' for this Jewish State. 

It's also a sign that something is broken in Israel. Very broken.

Israel's election problem is dangerous. Lately, Israel has found that it can't elect anyone. It keeps trying. But it fails.

That's not how a democracy is supposed to work.

Israel has a "democracy" problem, all right. Democracy is supposed to mean the art of agreement. But members of the government cannot seem to agree on anything. Not having a national budget in place (the reason the Knesset dissolved) is not the only problem plaguing this government. It's just the problem that collapsed the Knesset.

In theory, a government cannot operate without a budget. That's why the Knesset dissolved. But then, 2020's budget crisis has proven that, bottom line, a government can work without a budget. It simply works with a version of the last approved budget (in this instance, 2019). It's not ideal, but it works.

Not in Israel. In Israel, if there's no budget, the government, apparently, has to be abandoned.  

At least, that's the way it looks. "Budget" seems just an excuse to go to new elections. "Budget" hides what's really wrong--a breakdown of Israel's democracy.

Back in March 2020, Israeli voters saw the failure of the third of three election attempts to chose a Prime Minister. Voters were growing weary of election campaigns because in Israel, such campaigns are filled with more name-calling tantrums than policy discussions. 

In Israel, election campaigns are wearing. They don't educate or inform. They annoy.

Voters want results from their elections, not endless bickering. But by March 2020, the only solution for three failed elections that anyone could see was to form a "unity" government between Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud Party and Benny Gantz's Blue-White Party. These two men were chosen to create that 'unity" government because they were the two leading vote-getters of that election. 

The "unity" government was finalized in May, 2020. It lasted, maybe, seven months.

"Unity" for these two political enemies was not a match made in Heaven. It seemed more a match designed in Hell--and so it proved. 

Gantz and Netanyahu couldn't bond. If democracy is the "art of compromise",  this democracy knew none of that. Gantz and Netanyahu couldn't agree on "unity". They couldn't agree on a budget. They wouldn't agree on how to deal with the pandemic. Since the very beginning of this so-called unity government, the only thing the two men could create together was what one observer called, a "monstrosity" (here)--a government that was too big, too unwieldy and too crowded with people who seemed born to hate each other, to be effective.  

That hurts democracy. It undercuts what makes a democracy work--compromise and agreement.

The result was predictable. Lots of infighting. Lots of accusations. Plenty of back-stabbing and political sabotage--and no action. 

The result was a political crisis. This happened because politicians tried to do the impossible. They tried to mix political water (the demands of Gantz's Blue-White Party) with political oil (the demands of Netanyahu's Likud Party). No one in Israel seemed to understand that water and oil do not mix.

For the last several months, a fourth election in two years has seemed inevitable. Will yet another election really yield a different election outcome? Polls suggest no. We will end up, these polls suggest, with the same mess we have today.

That's not how a democracy is supposed to work.

Some in Israel expect that the campaign rhetoric in this election could be the ugliest and dirtiest in Israel's long and predictable history of dirty, ugly elections (here). Given the a political hatred that festers in Israel right now, they might be correct.

The problem is Netanyahu. It seems that more than half of Israel hate his guts--passionately. But it also seems that more than half of Israel also believes Netanyahu is Israel's best and smartest politician. To many, he's the best Jewish politician on the planet to deal with the kind of unrelentingly hostile, anti-Jewish attitudes Israel faces every day. Indeed, some in Israel feel Netanyahu is the only politician in Israel capable with dealing with that hostility.

The point here is, Israel needs Netanyahu. But too many in Israel hate him.

The unintended consequence of all this could do serious harm to Israel's democracy. Think about it: for two full years now, all four of these elections (including the one coming up) have been run by anti-Netanyahu-ers who have urged-urged-urged voters to vote Netanyahu out of office specifically "to protect Israel's democracy". 

For two years, that's all (or, almost all) voters have heard.The result of all these "save democracy" slogans has been dramatic: three failed elections, with no leader chosen. 

Is this what a democracy gives us--failure after failure? 

Voters have limited patience. How many elections are they supposed to endure? Voters are told to stand up for "democracy" (and get rid of Netanyahu). But when that "democracy" leads so consistently to failure, how do you expect voters to react? 

For voters, all these fruitless elections have proven very instructive. These elections highlighted two facts: (1) they were about "democracy";  but, (2), they failed to fulfill their democratic purpose--to elect someone.

Is this how a democracy works?

Another failed election could be trouble. Big trouble. If the best "democracy" can do for Israel is  failed elections, voters might want something better. They might wish to say, "good riddance" to the bad "democracy" they see.

Where will the fourth election lead? Stay tuned. Just don't be surprised if the march to the Final Jewish Redemption begins because voters have concluded that democracy has failed. They yearn for something better.

Chanukah, the State of Israel--and why it's important to celebrate this holiday

 (Note: This is an opinion piece. You are free to disagree. But if you do, perhaps you can tell me in the comments section available below. I'd be interested in what you have to say. Thanks )

(Last update: December 18, 2020)

Despite the fact that the Chanukah story took place more than 2100 years ago, this story is no fanciful ancient tale. It is instead a story that keeps repeating itself--even today. 

We might be wise to remember this.

On one level, Chanukah is about the clash of fundamental ideas about man, the world--and G-d. The Greeks of the Chanukah story believed in the existence of gods who ruled over our world. They believed in the power of Reason. They celebrated the human body.  

The religious Jews of the Chanukah period would have none of this. They didn't believe in multiple gods. They didn't believe that the Divine had physical form. Instead, they believed that their Heavenly Ruler was, in fact, not visible. Finally, they certainly didn't believe in celebrating the beauty of the human form. 

The Chanukah story is about two cultures. One culture, the "enlightened" Greeks, was called Hellenist. The other culture was religious Judaism. If ever there were two cultures which were diametrically opposed to each other, it was Greek Hellenism and religious Judaism. 

Hellenists believed in gods, all right--multiple gods who had form, shape, physical appearance and all-too-human appetites. Religious Jews believed in a G-d who was a single, singular Divinity who had no shape, no form, no physical appearance and none of the Greek gods' human appetites and failings.

The Greeks could  not believe that anyone would worship something invisible. That, to the Greeks, made no sense. 

Religious Jews didn't care what Hellenists thought.  The Hellenists, meanwhile, were offended by a Jewish G-d no one could see. 

To the Hellenist, Reason was everything: it drove their philosophy. It drove their inquiries into the natural world. It stood above all else. 

Religious Jews didn't buy that. For them, it wasn't Reason that was Supreme. It was G-d Himself. Reason, while important in Judaism, was secondary, not primary.

This was heresy to the Greeks. Again, to those so committed to the Supremacy of Reason, such an assertion--that there was something higher than Reason--made no sense. It was impossible. 

The religious Jews of Israel were simply not interested in Hellenism. These Jews would not accept the idea of worshiping multiple gods. They would not accept Reason as Supreme. They would not glorify the human form. They would not, as Hellenists often did, surrender to and then ennoble their carnal desires. 

The classical Hellenist world and the world of religious Judaism were poles apart (here). They were like water and oil--unmixable.

During that period in the 2nd Century BCE, many non-religious Jews flocked to Hellenism. They embraced the Greek culture--all aspects of it. Religious Jews rejected Hellenism. 

Israel society became divided, Hellenism vs Judaism. Some Jews embraced Hellenism and rejected their own Judaism. Other Jews clung to their traditions. 

That divide--along with a growing number of  seriously anti-Jewish actions by the Hellenists ruling over Israel--led to open conflict between the 'enlightened' Hellenist (both Jew and not Jew) against a band of Jews led by an "ultra-religious" Jewish family of Priests.  

Of course, the Chanukah story is about the wars fought between these Jews of Israel against their Hellenist enemies. The Jews at that time fought to throw the Greeks/Greek sympathizers out of the Jewish Holy Temple. They fought for the right to worship as they pleased. They won.

But this Chanukah story has another side to it. We can describe that 'second side' as, Jew vs Jew. 

Assimilation--specifically, the  movement of Jews away from their own religious traditions to other non-Jewish (and sometimes anti-Jewish) traditions--has been a Jewish problem for more than 2,000 years (here). Since the time of the Tanach, the history of the Jewish people has been characterized by two recurring themes: a history of the struggle of Jews against nations intent upon destroying the Jewish nation; and a story of Jews resisting other Jews who would stamp out major aspects of our Judaism. 

That double theme continues today. Even in 2020, there are groups in the world who seek the destruction of Israel. Even in today's Israel, there are individuals and politicians who demonize Israel's ultra-religious population--or who express disgust at Israel's Zionists who wish to settle our land. 

Even in 2020, we see in Israel political leaders who decry the 'Jewish'  nature of Israel. They speak openly of making Israel into a 'democratic' state. They want to erase what is 'Jewish' about Israel.

This is the modern Chanukah story: Jew vs Jew, Leftist vs (Rightist) Zionist. This Jew vs Jew story echoes the original Hellenism vs Judaism conflict. It's the modern version of the original.

The point of the Chanukah story of 2020 is that Hellenists--both old and new--forever attempt to destroy the Jewish religion in Israel. The Hellenists of old failed. But then, so do their modern spiritual descendants. 

My life--thanks to HaShem--has spanned, literally, three generations. During that time, I have  been blessed to have seen multiple Jewish, Chanukah-like victories. For me, the first such Jewish victory of these generations occurred in 1948 with the founding of the world's only Jewish State, Israel. 

Since then, I have seen other generational Jewish-Chanukah-like victories. These include the fact that, by 2020, there is more Torah in Israel that in any other place in the world--and, just as important--there are now more Jews in Israel today who believe that HaShem's Divine Hand affects our daily lives, than in any other place in the world. 

As one looks back across the last 72 years of religious Judaism's struggles in Israel, one is startled. What we see is nothing less than the echoes of the original Chanukah story. We see Jewish victories.

These are the lessons of the Chanukah story in our generation: first, the population of Israel's Torah-oriented Jews only grows stronger as time passes, not weaker; and, second, religion in Israel, despite what you might read in the news, is ever-more-bright, decade after decade. You can actually see this happening, especially when you compare 2020 to the period, 1946-48, when the founding of modern Israel unfolded.  

The struggle of the Chanukah-like Jew vs Jew conflict in Israel continues. But as this struggle continues, the Chanukah story is nevertheless retold every year, not just by the symbolic lighting of candles. It is retold as well because each year, our religion continues to spread--not recede--among Israeli Jews; and by that spread, Judaism triumphs.

That's why it's so important to celebrate Chanukah. The existence of Israel has proven that religious Jews are winning the modern battle for religious freedom. In small ways each year, we do relive the victory of the original Chanukah. 

Perhaps this awareness can help us enjoy the victory of the original Chanukah. Indeed, perhaps this is why it might be wise to keep these ongoing Jewish victories in mind when you light candles tonight for the last day of Chanukah, 2020. It may give you reason to celebrate the Jewish victories within your own generation.

Happy Chanukah!

How December 10-14, 2020 could turn into the "11th hour" for Donald Trump

 

Just before midnight on Monday, December 7, 2020, the state of Texas filed a lawsuit with SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the US) against four US states: Georgia, Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. This lawsuit alleged that "these states violated the Electors Clause of the US Constitution because they made changes to voting rules and procedures through the courts or through executive actions, but not through the state legislatures" as required by the Constitution (here). 

It would appear that Texas sees itself as having the right to ask SCOTUS to intervene in the 2020 electoral selection processes of these four states because Texas argues that the way in which these states violated Constitutional election requirements granted those four states advantages to certain voters not available to voters in other states (thereby violating the Constitutional concepts  of "due process" and "equal protection") (here). You can read the full details of this submission (here).

I think that's the basics of the Texas case. If someone wishes to 'set me straight', please do so through the "comments" section below (I will amend the essay to reflect your corrections). 

When this lawsuit hit the media (on Monday, December 7th), some typically pro-Trump observers suggested that the argument presented by Texas to the Supreme Court should get very high marks for "creativity". But they saw the chances of the lawsuit being successful as, at best, slim. One such observer said that, by any measure, this lawsuit appears to be the legal equivalent of a "Hail Mary" pass--a last-second act of desperation which has only a minor chance of succeeding (ibid). 

Some in the anti-Trump press were less circumspect in their reaction. Put simply, they laughed at the suit. They pointed out that, as of the December 7-8th time-period, the Trump attempt to get the courts to overturn the election had achieved a 1-51 record in the post-election litigation win-loss count (here). That meant that Trump had just a single court win in 52 attempts (if their numbers were correct). At least one of these voices mocked the Trump post-election legal efforts as  "Bizarro world desperation" (here).

The next day, December 8th, SCOTUS did something the anti-Trump media felt disinclined to report--but which could change everything. The Court issued an order (request?) that the four states being sued had until December 10 to argue against the alleged accusations of the suit (here). The deadline for these argument(s) was listed as 3 pm December 10th. 

While this suggests that the Court has not dismissed the suit out-of-hand, one cannot infer anything else from this action. We will have to wait until the Court rules on what it receives from the four states to see in what direction the case goes. At least, that's my opinion. 

The day after that, December 9th, the suit before the Court got interesting. On that date, four Amicus briefs ("friend of the Court") requests were filed with  SCOTUS, the  most significant of which came from the AG (Attorney General) of the state of Missouri. This brief was submitted to support the Texas AG's suit. This was significant because this Amicus wasn't a solitary voice in the proverbial wilderness. It brought with it the support of 16 more states (for a total of 17 states supporting Texas, plus Texas) (here, page 1). 

An 18th state, Arizona, also sent in a separate Amicus brief. This Arizona document appears to support the basic nature of the Texas case, but appears to add its own legal arguments for its support (here). 

This is an important development because, while having a total of 19 states (as of December 9th) submit/support a suit in SCOTUS certainly does not change "the legalities" of the case, it could change what at least one legal observer has called the "optics" of the case before the Court (here). This is to suggest that, suddenly, this lawsuit isn't a just case of one state (Texas) "going rogue"; it's now about a total of 19 Attorneys General alleging that the four states named in the suit had broken laws explicitly detailed in the US Constitution (ibid), violations that in some important way harmed their own election results (read the submissions (above) for details). 

19 states seeking legal redress from SCOTUS adds up to  38% of all US states seeking "justice". 38% is not an inconsequential number. Indeed, if over the next 50 hours or so more states support Texas in this suit, the Court could be looking at close to half the states objecting to how certain states violated the Constitution during this election. This might be interpreted as a kind of "legal national uprising" against this election. 

A host of US states supporting Texas could suggest a 'shot across the bow' of SCOTUS. It certainly shouts, 'THIS IS IMPORTANT!"

Will this case--and its supporters--now cause SCOTUS to sit up and take notice? Of course not. Or, well, maybe not. 

Or, then again, maybe yes. We don't know.

The point here is that this lawsuit might not succeed. This lawsuit could end up being Donald Trump's last chance to get the justice he says he deserves. This Texas case may become the end-of-the-line for Trump's bid to overturn the election results. 

Will this Texas case be nothing more than a 'Hail Mary' pass--an '11th hour' act of desperation? Stay tuned. We should find out soon enough.

--

PS: perhaps you wish to ask, since I live full-time in Israel, why should I care about what's happening in USA? 

It's a good question, so I will answer it. I worry about the 2020 US election precisely because I worry about Israel. That is, I specifically worry about Israel-US relations under a Biden administration. I am not the only one who feels this way (here).

I believe a Biden win will be bad for Israel. I worry about how Israel's international--and new Regional--status could change with a Biden administration in power in Washington.

I want what I feel is best for my country--Israel. That's why I write about the 2020 US election.

Donald Trump and the American betrayal: there's a message here US Jews should not ignore

 (Last update: December 9, 2020)

The title of this essay is unclear. It can have more than one meaning. 

First, it can mean that US President Donald Trump has betrayed America. For some in America, that is precisely why Trump was impeached by the US House of Representatives at the end of 2019. This is also why he has--so far--lost the 2020 national election. 

Such is the destiny, many in America say, of those who would betray their country. Such is Trump's destiny.

But this same title might mean something else: that America has betrayed Donald Trump. For other Americans, that is precisely why Trump is "losing" the 2020 election. He had accomplished much as President, these voices say, despite having to contend with a hostile, anti-Trump-obsessed media--and equally obsessed Democrat politicians. According to these American voices, Trump's current election problems derive in large measure from a corrupt media narrative that has successfully seduced enough Americans to destroy the Trump Presidency by voting for Joe Biden.

In truth, this essay is about both meanings.

In one sense, Donald Trump has indeed "betrayed" America. After all, he has become only the third US President in American history to be impeached. His behavior has, in other words, offended enough Americans that his impeachment became a necessity. 

Trump had 'misbehaved'. He had to be punished for his 'sins'; and he was. 

But that very impeachment revealed how it was America itself that might have betrayed its President. During the months leading up to that impeachment, Americans were told repeatedly (by the mainstream press) that Trump had committed crimes for which he needed to be impeached. 

During that same period, too many Americans accepted that drumbeat. Too few objected. The result was, according to some, America betrayed its President with a bogus impeachment.

Why was Trump impeached? Do you remember? 

Well, in the opening statement of Trump's impeachment trial, the Democrats' opening argument was presented by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rep. Adam Schiff (Calif-D). In that statement, Schiff did not accuse Trump of having committed treason. He did not accuse Trump of bribery. He accused Trump of seeking to "perpetuate himself in office by inviting foreign interference and cheating in an election" (ibid).  Trump needed to be impeached, Schiff argued, because Trump was a man "who would subvert the interests of his nation to pursue his own interests" (here).

Is this what you remember of his impeachment? Trump was impeached for "pursuing his own interests"? Really?

Yes, really. That is what Adam Schiff said about impeaching Donald Trump.

Here are some of Schiff's other allegations:

-Trump was a man "who would be a king" (ibid).

-Trump had worked to secure foreign interference in our democratic elections" (ibid).

-He had tried to use US State power to influence the Ukrainian President to act in a way that would "advantage himself [Trump] in our democratic election"...to win re-election in 2020" (ibid).

-He had tried to start a [corrupt] "investigation...into former Vice President Joe Biden, who had sought the removal of a corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor during the previous US administration" (ibid).

The list of his accusations goes on. You can read them all here. 

The bottom line here is that Donald Trump was not impeached because of "high crimes"--that is, because of bribery or treason. He was impeached for, essentially, what the Constitution calls, "misdemeanors"--crimes so inconsequential they are generally not worth prosecuting. 

What were Trump's misdemeanors? He had "abused his power". He had "obstructed" Congress" (here). 

Some in America today say that the 2020 elections were corrupted by several forms of illegal election "abuses"--and by outright fraud. These allegations have yet to be proven in court. Nevertheless, while the media in America has repeatedly called Trump "corrupt", the alleged "corruption" (fraud) of the 2020 election didn't come from Trump; it came, allegations say, from Democrats trying to unseat Trump.

Corrupt elections stain a nation's democracy. They suggest a betrayal of the most basic of a democracy's promises: honest and trustworthy elections. 

Who is now being accused of betrayal--Trump, or his enemies? His enemies.

Of course, Trump hasn't proven his case. At least, not yet.

Will he? G-d knows.

Nevertheless, the operative word here is not "proven". The operative word here is betrayal. 

The courts will decide what is the correct way to view the 2020 election: either Trump's allegations of fraud are correct; or, his enemies' saying Trump's allegations are "Pathetic", "Bizarre" and "Baseless". We will let the courts sort that out.

For our discussion, however, it's "betrayal" that counts. Betrayal involves dishonesty. It refers to "throwing someone under the bus". Is that what has happened in the 2020 elections--the attempt to throw Trump under the proverbial bus?

In America, some have argued that Trump betrayed America because he was power-hungry. Others have said, it wasn't Trump who was power-hungry, but a group of politicians and media personalities. They, not Trump, had betrayed America.

Who is correct? You tell me.  

Unfortunately for US Jews, betrayal is not limited to politics. It applies as well to Jews. 

In fact, one can argue that Jewish history is all about the betrayal of Jews. You see, betrayal is what happens to Jews when a surrounding non-Jewish culture needs a scapegoat. At one critical national or regional moment, Jews are betrayed. They are denounced. Their rights are taken from them. They are betrayed ("handed over") to federal or local authorities. They are oppressed. They are attacked.

Because they are Jews.

This is exactly what happened to Jews in the Biblical Exodus story. It's what happened to Jews in the Purim story. It's what happened in the Chanukah story. It's what happened in Europe during the Crusades. It's what happened during 17th-20th century pogroms in Europe and the Middle East.

It's what happened in the Holocaust. 

It continues. Around the world,  news stories fill with anti-Semitic sentiments. Everywhere, , people demonize Jews in speeches, on videos, in articles, in op-ed essays. Such attacks are part of a surrounding culture that finds such sentiments to be "normal" or "understandable"--or "true".

Betrayal is part of the darkness that has always threatened to engulf Jews. It is the "dark" part of Jewish existence that haunts both Jewish victims and their non-Jewish victimizers. 

One can argue that America has turned on its President. Will it now turn against its Jews?

If you don't think this is possible, consider this: Donald Trump has too much of a Jew track record. He's supported the Jews  too many time. He has, arguably, done more to help the Jewish State than any of his predecessors. 

For example, he moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. He recognized the importance of Jewish sovereignty over Judea Samaria. He appointed Nikki Haley to the UN, and she--with Trump's approval--did what no past President has done: she defended Israel as no US UN Ambassador had ever done. 

No other US President did so much for Jewish Israel. No one.

As things in America now stand, Joe Biden is scheduled to become the next US President on January 20, 2021. If that happens, will he build upon Trump's pro-Israel policies? Or, will he return to Obama's indifference and hostility?  

A look at Biden's early appointments suggests that a Biden Administration will not bring to Washington many pro-Israel, or even pro-Jewish, ideas. Too many of Biden's appointments-to-date helped to craft some of Obama's most anti-Israel policies. Caroline Glick warns that these appointments will not bring less antisemitism to America. They will instead bring a new kind of Jew-hate to America (here). 

Do you really believe these Obama-era appointees are eager to support a view of Jews and Israel that is kinder and gentler than Trump's view? 

More concerning for America's Jews is the rise of Progressivism in America. As Glick has pointed out (in yet another article on this same topic), progressives in the US have already, in essence, consigned Jews to the political outhouse called, "being white" (here). To a Progressive, "being white" may not be the ultimate in racism. But if you are looking for a racist, some Progressives believe, you might want to start by talking first with a white person--any white person (here, here). This means that, to a Progressive, Jews become "the perfect nemesis" (ibid). In plain English, this means simply that Jews in a Democrat-run, Progressive America may well end up with a target painted on their collective back. 

Jews are very close to being labelled with such a target.  Therefore, December 2020 might be the perfect moment for each US Jew to ask a simple question: does Progressivism-combined-with-a-Biden-America contain a message I should be thinking about? 

I don't see many US Jews asking such a question. 

In my opinion, the incoming Biden Administration, along with such friends as Black Lives Matters and ultra-Liberal academic supporters, could be preparing to betray some of America's most cherished ideals. These include (but are not limited to) such democracy-related concepts as a free press and the freedoms of speech and religion. Does this suggest that America also prepares to betray its Jews, who so benefit from these particular freedoms? 

Most US Jews will probably laugh--if not scoff--at such a thought. But do they scoff at their peril? 

From Israel, it certainly looks like Jews in the US are 'whistling in the dark'. With more than 70% (according to some numbers) of US Jews having voted for Joe Biden, it would appear that US Jews truly believe they'll be just fine in a society led by a Biden administration. PersonalIy, I see that as a gross--and dangerous-- mistake. 

What do you think? More important, what do you think US Jews should do?

The anniversary called, November 29th

 

November 29th is an Israel anniversary date. It commemorates the moment when, on November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed Resolution 181. 

Resolution 181 means something to Israel. It was the official UN Resolution that resolved to re-create the ancient Jewish homeland as a modern sovereign state. On November 29th , the UN voted to approve the creation of the world's only Jewish State. 

In May, 1948, the British Palestine Mandate ended. At that moment, this new Jewish State gave itself a name: the State of Israel.

Everyone in Israel should remember this date, for three reasons. The first reason is obvious: this date marks the rebirth of our ancient Jewish national homeland as a modern State. After almost 2,000 years of exile and persecution, the United Nations made certain on this date to return to us our natural, national homeland.

The second reason we should remember November 29, 1947 is that this is the one day each year we should re-learn the lessons of Resolution 181. The  lesson of Resolution 181 is simple: Its passage meant that Israel is legitimate. It has legal standing.

The third reason we should remember this date is to remind the UN it has failed repeatedly to fulfill its promises to the Jewish state.  Israel should hold the UN's collective 'feet' to the fire of truth--that its (the UN's) duty is to make sure all states, including this Jewish State, are protected under the Charter of the UN. 

Anti-Israel advocates question Israel's right to exist. They question Israel's legitimacy. This is why Israel should perform a public reading of 181 on November 29th--so it can validate that 181 was not a conditional document. It was not temporary. It was final. It made Israel a completely sovereign Member of the United Nations. It made Israel no different from any other state. 

Resolution 181 didn't make Israel a partial Member of the UN. It didn't make Israel a part-time Member. It made the Jewish state (whatever its name would be) a permanent Member of the family of nations. That vote gave Israel an unquestioned, legal legitimacy. 

Israel should remind the UN of that Resolution. Israel needs to remind the UN that 181 means that Israel has every right to exist.

On  November 29th, Israel should remind the UN that 181 implicitly gave to Israel a promise of peace and security. That was--and is--the UN Charter's promise all Member States. But that hasn't happened. Since December 1, 1947, just hours after Resolution 181 passed, Israel has seen neither peace nor security. 

If there is no peace and security for Israel, that isn't Israel's fault. It's the fault of the Arabs around Israel who absolutely refuse to accept the provisions of 181. Israel's lack of peace and security is also the fault of the UN itself. The anti-Jew attacks against the nascent state began almost immediately. Yet the UN never lifted a finger to aid the Jewish State. 

When you read Resolution 181 (below), consider how Israel's Arab enemies violated its terms even before the proverbial ink had dried. You should also consider how the UN did nothing to protect Israel or to force those Arabs to become compliant with the Resolution.

Here's how both Arabs and the UN violated Res.181:

1. 181 promised that, regarding the creation of two states, if there should arise a threat to peace, a breach of peace or acts of aggression during the transition period to two states for two peoples, the UN would take whatever measures were necessary to stop those threats and aggression (according to the UN Charter's Articles 39-42). 

However, once 181 passed, Arabs immediately resorted to acts of aggression against the new Jewish state. Since the passage of 181, Arabs have violated its terms consistently,  repeatedly, and with violence. Much to its shame, the UN has taken no active action to reverse any Arab aggression, or to address any Arab violation of 181. The UN violated its own Charter.

2. In 181, both sides were called upon to implement the Resolution. The Arabs refused to do this. The UN took no steps to implement 181. The UN did nothing to enforce the conditions of 181. The UN violated its own formal requirement.

3. 181 made clear that the two peoples most affected by this Resolution were to take no action that would hamper its implementation. The Arabs violated that call. The UN did not act against that violation. The UN did  nothing to stop Arab violence against Jews in what was to become Israel. The UN violated its own formally-stated requirement.

4. Neither the newly-created Jewish nor the newly-created Arab State mentioned in 181 were to use force against any other State in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations (to establish peace and security between nations). The Arabs violated this provision. The UN did nothing to stop that violation. The UN violated its own requirement.

5. Both sides were required to offer equal rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters. The Arabs violated this requirement. The UN did nothing to correct those violations. The UN violated its  Charter.

6. Both sides were to agree to create economic cooperation mechanisms. The Arabs violated that provision. The UN did nothing to persuade the Arabs to abandon such violations. The UIN violated its own stated requirements.

7. Access to Holy Places and religious building in the Holy Land were to be maintained and repaired as needed. The Arabs violated this provision. The UN did nothing to correct those violations. The UN violated its requirements.

8.Freedom of worship for all--especially in Jerusalem--was to be granted. The Arabs violated this provision. The UN did nothing to make certain this freedom was guaranteed. The UN violated its own requirements.

9. Each of the two states created by 181 was to offer adequate primary and secondary education to all within their respective state, particularly for the minority populations within their state. The Arabs violated this provision. The UN did nothing about this violation. The UN violated its own requirements.

10. Jerusalem  was to remain an open, international city, with freedom of religion, worship and access to Holy cites granted to all. The Arabs violated this provision. The UN did nothing to force the Arabs to abide by this provision. The UN violated its own Charter.

In sum, neither the Arab enemies of Israel nor the United Nations followed the dictates of Resolution 181. Each November 29th, Israel should tell the UN that Israel will not accept any rulings by the UN as binding until all the violations of 181 be addressed, including the imposition of appropriate compensation and penalties for violations.

On November 29th of each year, Israel should expose the UN for what it is: a hypocritical, useless entity which has never stood up for its Member State, Israe. 

Here is 181. For your convenience, I have made bold key phrases and sentences:

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by l August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

1. The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
2. The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
3. The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
4. The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
5. 
   

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly,

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
3. 
   The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
4. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.
5. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
6. 
   

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.
2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.
   In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.
3. 
   
4. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
5. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
6. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.
   
   
7. If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.
8. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.
9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.
10. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.
11. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.
12. 
    This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
13. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
14. 
    The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.
15. 
    Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
    Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.
16. 
    During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.
17. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:
    1. Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
    2. 
       
    3. Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
    4. 
       
    5. Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;
    6. 
       
    7. Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
    8. 
       
    9. Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.
18. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
19. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
20. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
21. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
22. 
    The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
    The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.
23. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter I: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.
3. 
   Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.
4. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in an way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
5. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.
6. 
   No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
7. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.
8. 
   

Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
7. 
   The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
8. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
9. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.

Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations

1. Citizenship

Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. International conventions

1. The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
2. Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. 
   

3. Financial obligations

1. The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
2. These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.
3. A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.
4. Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holders and the State.
5. 
   

Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions

1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.
2. 
   
3. Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice 
2. 
   
3. and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
4. 
   
5. 
   
   The Economic Union of Palestine
6. 
   
7. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:
   1. A customs union;
   2. 
      
   3. A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
   4. 
      
   5. Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
   6. 
      
   7. Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
   8. 
      
   9. Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
8. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.
9. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
10. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
11. 
    
12. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
13. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.
14. In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
15. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2(b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that - to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources - each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.
16. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
17. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.
18. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
19. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
    1. The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
    2. 
       
    3. The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
    4. 
       
    5. The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine, consisting of:
    6. 
       
       1. The service of the outstanding public debt;
       2. 
          
       3. The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.
20. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.
21. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority of the Joint Economic Board.
22. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.
23. 
    
24. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
25. 
    
26. 
    
    Freedom of Transit and Visit
27. 
    
28. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.
29. 
    
    Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the Undertaking
30. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
31. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
32. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.
2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Part II. - Boundaries

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. There it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr-I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr-I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr-I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and 'Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west comer, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road of I'billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'billin situated to the west of the I'billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-District boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zie'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El- Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El-Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi 'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and 'Ibdis. From the south-east corner of 'Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of 'Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez-Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as 'Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima. Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-EI 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. El-Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi 'Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, section B, below).

Part III. - City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:

1. Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
   1. To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
   2. 
      
   3. To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
2. Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
   The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. 
   
4. 3. Local autonomy
5. 
   
   1. The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
   2. The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part the present municipality of Jerusalem.
   3. 
      
6. Security measures
7. 
   
   1. The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
   2. Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
   3. 
      
   4. To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
   5. 
      
8. Legislative Organization.
9. 
   A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
10. Administration of Justice.
11. 
    The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.
12. Economic Union and Economic Regime.
13. 
    The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of thc United Nations and their nationals.
14. Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.
    Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
15. Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of thc City.
16. 
    
17. Official languages.
18. 
    Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.
19. 
    
20. Citizenship.
21. 
    All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
22. 
    The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.
23. 
    
24. Freedoms of citizens
25. 
    
    1. Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
    2. 
       
    3. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
    4. 
       
    5. All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
    6. 
       
    7. The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
    8. 
       
    9. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
    10. 
        
    11. The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
    12. 
        The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
    13. 
        
    14. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
    15. 
        
26. Holy Places
27. 
    
    1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
    2. Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
    3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
    4. 
       
    5. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
28. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.
1. The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.
2. 
   
3. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
4. 
   
5. The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.
   In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
6. 
   
29. 
    

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime of the City.

Part IV. Capitulations

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

Adopted at the 128th plenary meeting.

--

This Resolution is a very, very long document. It appears thorough. It appears serious. It contains countless details.

One would think that such a well-thought-out document meant something. One would think the reason for its thoroughness and detail was to make sure these two states could survive. It seemed at the time (1947) reasonable to believe that, because of the existence and the implicit promises of the UN Charter, that all requirements herein would be enforced. 

But that was false. Nothing was enforced. 

Therefore, on November 29th of each year, Israel should remember the promise of 181. Israel should remember what this document stated when its 'birth' was "approved". 

Israel should also remember the subsequent betrayal of the UN. Indeed, Israel should declare the UN betrayal each year to the world until that betrayal has been remedied.